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CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FAILURES
AND THE MANAGERIAL DUTY OF CARE
CHERYL L. WADEt
INTRODUCTION
Thanks to a plentiful supply of news reports and extensive
coverage of congressional hearings concerning the Enron
bankruptcy, Sherron Watkins has become a prominent character
in the Enron saga. Watkins was Enron's Vice-President of
Corporate Development, working with Andrew Fastow, Enron's
former Chief Financial Officer (CFO) and Executive Vice-
President.' It was not Watkins' work as Vice-President that led
her to prominence; rather, it was her role as Enron's only
whistleblower that thrust her into the spotlight. Watkins wrote
a memorandum to Kenneth Lay, Enron's former Chairman and
Chief Executive Officer (CEO), stating that she was "incredibly
nervous that [Enron would] implode in a wave of accounting
scandals."2 It was her work with Fastow that led to Watkins'
suspicions regarding accounting fraud and her resulting
"incredible nervousness" about Enron's failure to comply with
accounting and disclosure rules.3 Why was Watkins the only
Enron manager who questioned what seemed to have been
blatant improprieties in the way senior executives did business?
Would the company's public humiliation and vilification have
been avoided if more Enron officers had notified the entire board
(and not just Kenneth Lay) about suspected wrongdoing? I
cannot answer the latter question. We will never know what
would have happened if more Enron officers who were not
involved in the wrongdoing that led to the company's downfall
had communicated with Lay and other board members about
t Professor of Law, St. John's Universtiy School of Law.
1 PETER C. FUSARO & Ross M. MILLER, WHAT WENT WRONG AT ENRON 155
(2002).
2 Id. at 185.
s Id. at 155.
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problems within the company. I can attempt to answer the first
question. Enron managers, other than Watkins, remained silent
about the company's problems in order to avoid professional
suicide. Complaints from Enron's executive vice-presidents and
other managers about apparent improprieties would have been
complaints about the boss. In fact, after writing her
memorandum to Lay, Watkins was transferred to human
resources. 4 While Watkins was demoted, CEO Lay failed to
respond to the concerns she expressed.
One of the questions explored in this Article is the potential
role of corporate officers in revealing unlawful behavior within
the firm. My focus is on officers who are not board members,
and who are not themselves involved in conflicts or wrongdoing
that may potentially harm the company-corporate officers such
as Sherron Watkins. I examine the often-stated proposition that
corporate officers owe a fiduciary duty of care.
One of the conclusions I make in this Article is that a
greater emphasis on standards of care for both directors and
officers is warranted, especially in the aftermath of the corporate
governance failures that scandalized Enron, WorldCom, and
other large publicly held companies. Reaction to judicial
condemnation of directorial behavior by finding a breach of the
board's duty of care in Smith v. Van Gorkum5 illustrates the
need to revitalize duty of care analysis. Delaware's legislature
responded to, the Van Gorkum holding by enacting section
102(b)(7), 6 which allows Delaware companies to limit or
eliminate directorial liability for duty of care breaches in their
certificates of incorporation. Other states have enacted similar
legislation.7 Yet, even where a state statute limits liability, it
would be hard to imagine that in Van Gorkum's aftermath, a
board would approve major corporate events and transactions,
such as a merger, in the same way condemned by the Delaware
Supreme Court-namely, after only a brief oral presentation
concerning the event, and without having read materials
documenting the event.
4 Id.
5 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985) (finding breach of fiduciary duty where board
approved acceptance of tender offer only two hours after learning of the offer and
without getting an appraisal or even reading the proposed offer).
6 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2001).
7 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 2-202(b)(4) (1994); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7.1.1-48(6)
(1999).
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Commentators have offered empirical evidence that the
enactment of section 102(b)(7) not only reduced shareholder
wealth in Delaware but also negatively impacted the market
when firms announced that they would limit or eliminate
directors' personal liability.8 Reduced or eliminated standards of
care under section 102(b)(7) harm Delaware shareholders. The
value of their firms decrease when standards of care are
diminished or eliminated.
The Delaware Chancery Court in In re Caremark
International Inc. Derivative Litigation9 provided guidance with
respect to the type of directorial behavior that would breach the
fiduciary duty of care. In Caremark, Chancellor Allen opined
that where a board has acted in a grossly negligent manner or
has failed to monitor corporate compliance with relevant federal
or state law, there has been a duty of care breach. While
Caremark is a settlement opinion with no precedential value, its
significance may be found in Chancellor Allen's clarification of
the directors' standard of care. 10
The standards set forth in Van Gorkum and Caremark have
not proved particularly helpful in holding directors accountable
for breaches due to liability limiting legislation such as
Delaware's section 102(b)(7). Such statutes reflect the view that
duty of care breaches should be difficult for plaintiffs to litigate
so as not to diminish the willingness of directors to take risks
that might otherwise enhance shareholder value. This is not to
say the standards set forth -in these cases are not significant.
They are useful for articulating and clarifying a standard of care
s See Michael Bradley & Cindy A. Schipani, The Relevance of the Duty of Care
Standard in Corporate Governance, 75 IOWA L. REV. 1, 69 (1989). It is further
asserted:
The significant decrease in the relative value of Delaware firms both
around the enactment of Section 102(b)(7) and when they elect to adopt the
provisions of the statute indicate that relaxed liability exposure for
violations of the duty of care standard allowed by this act has reduced the
wealth of the stockholders of Delaware firms. The results are consistent
with the view that the new regime established by Section 102(b)(7) allows
corporate managers wider latitude in managing their firms, which in turn
increases the agency costs of the corporate form and reduces the value of
the equity claims of these firms.
Id.
9 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
10 See generally Cheryl L. Wade, Racial Discrimination and the Relationship
Between the Directorial Duty of Care and Corporate Disclosure, 63 U. PiTT. L. REV.
389 (2002).
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that can be utilized by officers and directors. And although there
is little threat of large verdicts, the potential for any duty of care
litigation should serve as an incentive to boards to satisfy their
duties. Furthermore, section 102(b)(7) does not preclude the
possibility of injunctive relie 1 and allows for limitation or
elimination of liability for breaches by directors only-not
managers' breaches. 12
Much has been written about the directorial duty of care,
including analyses that distinguish standards applicable to
inside and outside directors. 13 Much less has been written about
the managerial duty of care. One of the questions examined in
this Article is why courts, commentators, and plaintiffs' lawyers
fail to distinguish analyses of duty of care breaches in a way that
focuses on the roles played by corporate actors. 14 I conclude that
courts and attorneys should distinguish analysis of the duty of
care owed by corporate executives or managers from the duty of
care owed by directors. I suggest an analytical approach that
distinguishes the standard of care owed by officers from that
owed by directors. Principles requiring reasonableness and
rationality govern duty of care analysis for both directors and
officers. The standard of care owed by officers and directors is
the same, but the amount of care owed by a company's
managers, dealing with day to day affairs, is unavoidably higher
than the amount of care owed by a company's outside directors,
who have far less contact and involvement with the company.
Thus far, courts have not distinguished between the care owed
by boards and executives, leading to the conclusion that breaches
of the duty of care could not be proven even in instances where
11 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2001) (eliminating only "monetary
damages" for a breach); Arnold v. Soc'y for Sav. Bancorp, Inc., 678 A.2d 533, 542
(Del. 1996).
12 § 102(b)(7) ,("A provision eliminating or limiting the personal liability of a
director to the corporation .. ") (emphasis added).
13 "An outside director is generally defined as a director who is otherwise
unaffiliated with and independent of the corporation." Bradley & Schipani, supra
note 8, at 21.
14 In Van Gorkum, for example, the defendant directors' attorneys failed to
separate arguments for outside and inside directors even after the judge asked
whether it would be appropriate to do so. The court concluded that "since all of the
defendant directors, outside as well as inside, take a unified position, we are
required to treat all of the directors as one." Donald E. Pease, Outside Directors:
Their Importance to the Corporation and Protection from Liability, 12 DEL. J. CORP.
L. 25 (1987).
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managerial slothfulness or inattentiveness was blatant and
egregious.
Greater clarification regarding the duty of care owed by
corporate directors and officers may create more corporate
watchdogs and potential whistleblowers. It is important to
clarify and articulate the duty of care owed by corporate officers,
including the CEO, CFO, presidents, vice-presidents, and
treasurers. The focus must include those who allow potential
malfeasance to occur and persist without reporting, disclosing, or
investigating it. This focus is imperative because corporate
boards and attorneys cannot ensure corporate legal compliance
on their own.
Corporate officers beyond the CEO and CFO must be
aggressive in coming forward when they suspect wrongdoing.
This increase in the number of corporate monitors is essential in
preventing the types of corporate governance failures that led to
corporate scandals at Enron and other companies. This is
especially true in light of one of the corporate governance
reforms requiring that a majority of a board be composed of
independent directors. When most of a board's members are
independent, it will be less likely to detect malfeasance because
its members are not involved in the day-to-day matters of the
company. Outside directors have less time for, and less
information about, the company. Corporate presidents and vice-
presidents who are in the corporate trenches are the ones best
positioned to discover wrongdoing. Corporate executives already
owe a duty of care without reforming any of the rules relating to
corporate governance. That duty, however, must be clarified,
revitalized, and emphasized to guide officers and to inspire the
kind of conduct that will change corporate cultures and help to
restore investor confidence.
In addition to suggesting a theoretical approach that
distinguishes the managerial standard of care from the duty
owed by directors, I offer a practical proposal that creates a
relationship between board members and senior corporate
officers who do not serve on the board. In order to satisfy their
duty of care, managers should have available to them a method
of communicating with outside directors concerning possible
malfeasance that will not jeopardize their professional standing
within the company. One way to accomplish this is for the board
to establish a system of communication between its members
2002]
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and officers who do not serve on the board. Obviously, managers
should be able to communicate with independent directors in
confidence. In order to explore the benefits of greater officer-
director communication I also examine the problem of racial
discrimination in the corporate setting.
The facts of the corporate governance debacles at Enron and
other companies continue to unfold. The one thing that seemed
apparent almost immediately was that Enron's board was not
adequately informed about the company's business affairs.
Corporate governance reformers should consider ways to
establish a relationship between the board and corporate officers
who are not serving as directors, and who are not involved in
alleged malfeasance. Communication with such officers will
result in a better-informed board.
One reason for the scant discussion in legal commentary,
legislation, and case law of the managerial duty of care may be
that fiduciary duty analysis in the corporate context was
intended to protect shareholders from managers. It seems
paradoxical to suggest, as I do in this Article, that managerial
satisfaction of the duty of care may help protect the corporation
and shareholders. I suggest that managers should be clear
about the fiduciary duty of care they owe, and I suggest how to
satisfy that duty even though fiduciary duty law is aimed at
deterring potential managerial abuses that are made possible
because of the separation between a company's owners and
managers.
I. THE DUTY OF CARE
A. Background and Criticisms of the Corporate Law Duty of
Care
The articulation of the standard of care owed by corporate
directors and officers derives from tort law, which imposes a
duty to behave as a reasonable and prudent person would in a
given situation. 15 In addition to requiring directors to exercise
due care when making business decisions, directors owe a duty
to monitor the corporation's business through a system of
information-gathering designed to bring salient facts to the
15 Melvin Aaron Eisenberg, The Duty of Care of Corporate Directors and
Officers, 51 U. PITT. L. REV. 945, 947 (1990).
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board's attention.16 Included in the duty of care is a duty of
inquiry triggered upon notice of potential problems. 17
There are several longstanding criticisms of the application
of a duty of care in the corporate context. For example, the duty
of care has been condemned for vagueness.18 It has also been
observed that with the benefit of hindsight anyone can formulate
an argument that a board's failure to satisfy its duty of care
caused corporate losses. 19 Commentators have asserted that
imposition of a duty of care costs too much: companies must
spend large sums of money compensating board members for
increased time spent making decisions and monitoring the
corporation and will also need to spend large sums of money on
experts to advise the board about the duty of care.20 Another
argument against recognition of a corporate law duty of care is
the chilling effect that such an imposition has on the decisions
and risk-taking that may potentially benefit shareholders. 21
Finally, imposition of a duty of care has been criticized because it
requires judicial determinations about whether the duty is
breached by judges, who have no business expertise.22
Since I conclude that a revitalized duty of care may help
prevent corporate governance failures of the type that occurred
at Enron and other companies, I will briefly address some of the
longstanding criticisms of the duty of care. First, the standard is
vague because it must be flexible enough for a variety of
situations. For example, the standard must be applicable to both
large and small companies. This flexibility is accomplished by
language that looks to the reasonableness of a person in a
similar position. Second, while it may be easy, with the benefit
of hindsight, to allege duty of care breaches, a conclusion that
the duty has been breached should be reached only in instances
of grossly negligent or inattentive behavior; only egregious
misconduct breaches the directorial duty of care. Moreover, the
16 Id. at 952, 955.
17 Id. at 956.
18 See Tamar Frankel, Corporate Directors' Duty of Care: The American Law
Institute's Project on Corporate Governance, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 705, 707 (1983);
William F. Kennedy, The Standard of Responsibility for Directors, 52 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 624, 632-33 (1983).
19 See Frankel, supra note 18, at 710-11; Kennedy, supra note 18, at 630-31.
20 See, e.g., Frankel, supra note 18, at 712-13.
21 See id. at 713.
22 See id. at 714-15.
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standard of care is applied to the process of decision-making and
not the result of the decision. Third, greater remuneration for
directors, who in return will spend more time and pay more
attention to corporate affairs, makes sense if costly mistakes
that result from extreme inattention are prevented. Higher fees
for directors may increase their willingness to monitor and
inquire, possibly uncovering or preventing managerial abuses or
fraud. Fourth, while directors will still take risks, with a
revitalization of the duty of care, unconsidered risk-taking may
be avoided. Fifth, courts do not need business expertise to
recognize extreme inattention and negligence. This is the only
kind of behavior that would breach the corporate duty of care.
B. Revitalizing the Duty of Care: A Theoretical Approach to the
Fiduciary Duty of Care That Distinguishes Officers from
Directors.
"[I]f one is inclined toward greater accountability for
corporate management, the obligation to come forward and to
suggest appropriate standards of conduct under the directors'
duty of care becomes difficult to avoid."2 3 Revitalization and
clarification of the duty of care may help corporate boards and
managers avoid the types of corporate governance failures that
led to the collapse of Enron and other large publicly-held
companies. The Van Gorkum and Caremark opinions provide
language that may help corporate boards satisfy a standard of
care that would preclude the kind of extreme and egregious
inattention that allowed corporate'malfeasance to fester and
destroy Enron, WorldCom, Adelphia, Tyco, and ImClone. 24 The
problem with current case law on the corporate duty of care is
that it focuses on the directorial duty of care and almost
completely ignores analysis and description of the officers' duty
of care.
Case law and state codes are not consistent with respect to
managerial liability for duty of care breaches. "It is reasonably
23 Philip C. Sorensen, Discretion and Its Limits-An Analytical Framework for
Understanding and Applying the Duty of Care to Corporate Directors (And Others),
66 WASH. U. L.Q. 553,554 (1988):
24 See Smith v. Van Gorkum, 488 A.2d 858, 874 (Del. 1985) (concluding that
"the Board of Directors did not reach an informed business judgment"); In re
Caremark Int'l. Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 970 (Del. Ch. 1996) (discussing
circumstances that can lead to director liability for breach of the standard of care).
[Vol.76:767
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well-settled that officers owe a duty of care to the corporation. It
is less well settled that officers get the benefit of the business
judgment rule. Under the ALI Principles, the rule applies to
both directors and officers. Judicial precedents are divided,
however."25 This means that in some jurisdictions, it may be
difficult for shareholders to hold managers accountable for duty
of care breaches because of the protection of the business
judgment rule.
The content of the standard of care for corporate officers and
directors is substantially the same. It is the amount of care that
each owes under the standard that differs radically. The tort
law duty of care requires that an actor with special skills and
knowledge use them before being deemed to have satisfied the
duty of care.26 This is one basis for distinguishing due care
analysis owed by managers from that which is owed by directors.
Corporate managers have knowledge and expertise concerning
the corporation that outside directors will not have. Applying
the approach taken under tort law would mean that managers
who fail to use their special knowledge of the corporation breach
their duty of care.
II. RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN THE CORPORATE WORKPLACE
In this part, I focus on another type of corporate
wrongdoing-racial discrimination. I compare the relatively
mild public reaction to allegations of racial discrimination in the
corporate workplace to the furor created by the Enron scandal.
The September 11th attacks on the United States and the huge
scandal surrounding the Enron bankruptcy threaten to
inalterably eclipse discourse concerning this nation's enduring
problem with racism. One of the goals of this Article is to
continue the consideration of race matters by focusing on the
relationship between corporate boards and managers,
particularly managers who are not also directors, and who have
engaged in no intentional wrongdoing.
25 STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 285 (2002).
26 Hills v. Sparks, 546 S.W.2d 473, 476 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977) (holding that an
actor with special skills "is required to exercise the superior qualities that he has in
a manner reasonable under the circumstances" (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 289 (1965))); Fredericks v. Castora, 360 A.2d 696, 697-98 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1976) (suggesting that one who has special skills, such as a doctor, will be held to a
higher standard of care).
2002]
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Much has changed about the nature of racial relationships
since the Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s. Lunch counters
are integrated, and black and brown faces are seen in the fronts
of buses. But more than four decades later, insidious racial
inequities endure. The American workplace, governed by the
managers of large publicly held corporations, is the locus of
much of today's racial injustice.27 Workplace discrimination in
hiring, promotion, and pay, and the corporate governance
processes that allow for continuing bias in employment
relationships, should be the focus of civil and human rights work
in this new millennium.
Why does workplace discrimination persist? The accounting
practices and other alleged wrongdoing that led to the Enron
collapse is illustrative. Obviously, Enron's board should not
have deferred to the financial decisions made by the managers
they were supposed to monitor. Business Week reported that
27 Workplace discrimination in the United States endures, despite prohibitions
against employment inequities based on race, gender, religion, and national origin
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000).
Title VII provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer... to fail or
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin.
Id. In recent years, discrimination complaints filed with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission have increased. "Not since the height of the civil rights
movement in the 1960s have there been so many race, sex and age discrimination
lawsuits.... [Tihe number of companies with employees in litigation against them
rose to 63% in 1995, a 10% increase over 1993." Connie Aitcheson, Corporate
America's Black Eye, BLACK ENTERPRISE, Apr. 1997, at 109. "The EEOC has
thousands of pending investigations and lawsuits regarding civil rights violations in
the workplace." Eric L. Smith, Playing the Corporate Race Card, BLACK
ENTERPRISE, Jan. 1997, at 19. Many large U.S. companies have paid huge amounts
to settle discrimination claims. In 1996, Texaco settled a racial discrimination suit
for $176 million. See BARI-ELLEN ROBERTS & JACK WHITE, ROBERTS VS. TEXACO: A
TRUE STORY OF RACE AND CORPORATE AMERICA 274-75 (1998); Jack E. White,
Texaco's High-Octane Racism Problems: Piles of Cash and Substantial Reforms Fail
to Reverse the Call for Boycott, TIME, Nov. 25, 1996, at 34. Shoney's in 1992 and
Coca-Cola in 2000 settled race discrimination suits for $134.5 million and $192.5
million respectively. See Michelle McCann, Note, Shareholder Proposal Rule:
Cracker Barrel in Light of Texaco, 39 B.C. L. REV. 965, 967 (1998); Greg Winter,
Coca-Cola Settles Racial Bias Case, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2000, at Al. In 1997,
Publix Supermarkets paid $81.5 million, Home Depot paid at least $104 million,
and in 1998, Mitsubishi paid $34 million to settle sexual harassment or sex
discrimination claims. See Steven M. H. Wallman, Equality Is More Than "Ordinary
Business," N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 1997, at 12.
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Enron's former chief executive "created and embodied the in-
your-face Enron culture, where risk-taking, deal-making, and
'thinking outside the box' were richly rewarded, while controls
appeared loose at best."28 The Enron implosion offers lessons for
the way the relationship between boards and managers should
change. A system of communication between the board and
managers who do not serve on the board and who are not
involved in malfeasance may provide the board, especially
outside directors, with the information they need to adequately
monitor compliance with law. -These observations are also
relevant in considering other types of managerial malfeasance,
including racial discrimination at companies such as Texaco and
Coca-Cola. 29
The difference in public reaction to the Enron bankruptcy on
the one hand, and the allegations of racial discrimination on the
other hand, present a significant and meaningful dissimilarity.
The public's outrage in reaction to Enron is an interesting
contrast to the much quieter reaction of the public to the details
that led up to the filing of racial discrimination litigation against
Texaco and Coca-Cola. Elected officials and the public
demanded greater vigilance and examination of the accounting
practices of companies other than Enron. "Even companies once
considered above suspicion are being subjected to increasing
scrutiny."30 Significant changes in the law have occurred in the
aftermath of the Enron and WorldCom debacles. The Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 (the "Act")31 is the first such change. The
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and various stock
exchanges are expected to revise their rules.32
There were no public calls for enhanced scrutiny of the equal
opportunity employment practices of companies other than
Texaco and Coca-Cola after the two class actions were settled.
There was no demand for heightened vigilance of companies with
few or, more often than not, no people of color in their ranks of
senior executives or on boards of directors.
28 Wendy Zellner, Jeff Skilling: Enron's Missing Man, BUS. WK., Feb. 11, 2001,
at 38.
29 See ROBERTS & WHITE, supra note 27; Winter, supra note 27.
30 Daniel Kadlec, Under the Microscope, TIME, Feb. 4, 2002, at 29.
31 Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745.
32 See, e.g., § 308(c)(2) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7246) ("The [S.E.C.] shall
report its findings [regarding its enforcement actions over the last five years] ...
and shall use such findings to revise its rules and regulations as necessary.").
2002]
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A. The Role of Corporate Lawyers.
What is the role of corporate lawyers in helping boards and
managers make decisions that diligently ensure compliance with
law? External law that governs private corporate conduct is
often open to conflicting interpretations. For example, while it is
clear that Title VII prohibits workplace discrimination,
discriminatory conduct is not easily recognized. Discrimination
in the workplace may be unconscious, covert, or subtle and,
therefore, difficult to detect. Corporate lawyers can help
managers interpret the law in a way that ensures responsible
behavior towards employees. This means that corporate lawyers
will have to help change the way corporate boards operate when
they make decisions and supervise the conduct of corporate
officers. Lawyers must encourage corporate directors to avoid
the psychological pitfalls of group decision-making that prevent
the adequate monitoring of corporate compliance with the law.
Corporate lawyers can help directors and senior executives
understand that in large companies unlawful or discriminatory
conduct on the part of some employees may be inevitable. This
should be easier to understand in the aftermath of Enron. The
Enron debacle makes it more difficult to claim surprise about
directorial and managerial wrongdoing. Lawyers can help
corporate managers respond more appropriately to inevitable
allegations of wrongdoing. Lawyers can help corporate
managers protect the public image of their companies by
encouraging them to make socially responsible choices that
comply with applicable law.
The notion that corporate lawyers should guide corporate
directors and managers toward ethically and socially responsible
decision-making seems intuitively sensible, even if a bit
idealistic. The important question, however, is whether
corporate lawyers are able to move their clients toward social
responsibility as a practical matter. Will clients listen?
Investigations of the Enron crisis revealed that managers failed
to follow advice of counsel. The quixotic nature attempts by
corporate lawyers to inspire socially responsible corporate
activity is also demonstrated by a 1995 wrongful discharge case
brought by in-house counsel for GTE Products Corporation. 33
One of the plaintiffs claims was that he was constructively
33 GTE Prods. Corp. v. Stewart, 653 N.E.2d 161 (Mass. 1995).
[Vol.76:767
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discharged by GTE for having encouraged its management to
"warn the public about safety risks associated with the use of
certain GTE products, and his insistence that GTE comply with
federal law governing the disposal of hazardous waste."34 The
plaintiff claimed that one GTE officer warned that the plaintiff
"should stop being the 'social conscience' of the company."35
Section 307 of the Act requires a significant change in the
relationship between corporate counsel and their clients.36 In a
sense, the Act requires corporate lawyers to be the company's
social conscience and to report failures to comply with law.
Enhanced communication between directors and managers
who are not on the board may prevent the kinds of corporate
governance failures that led to the huge settlements of racial
discrimination litigation paid in the 1990s. A system of
communication between boards and officers who are not on the
board, but who are likely to have pertinent information, may
have prevented the type of board inattention that led to the
failures at Enron, WorldCom, and other companies.
One concern that many have in Enron's aftermath is
whether any of the enacted or proposed changes in corporate
governance will make a real difference in the way boards and
managers conduct business. When companies are profitable in
the future, will the extensive discourse about corporate social
responsibility that has occurred recently be forgotten? What will
inspire boards and managers to take seriously the notion of
corporate social responsibility in the future?
In this Article, my primary focus is on compliance with law
as a type of corporate social responsibility. Community activists
can play a role that enhances socially responsible corporate
behavior by publicizing and protesting against corporate conduct
that harms employees or other constituencies. Traditional
considerations of the impact of corporate activity on non-
shareholder constituencies have focused on the decisions made
by corporate officers and directors. It is possible to fashion a
broader model for potential participants in, and contributors to,
34 Id. at 163.
35 Id. at 164.
36 Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 307 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7245) (directing the
SEC to promulgate "rules of professional responsibility for attorneys" that require
corporate counsel to monitor corporate conduct and, where necessary, report
misconduct to the board of directors).
2002]
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efforts aimed at enhancing corporate social responsibility. This
model would require an element of self-responsibility on the part
of consumers who can make decisions about the products and
services they purchase in a way that will make discriminatory
behavior less than profit maximizing. Community activists can
organize boycotts. Corporate lawyers can help directors and
senior executives understand that in large companies, unlawful
or discriminatory conduct on the part of some employees may be
inevitable. Lawyers can help corporate managers respond more
appropriately to inevitable allegations of wrongdoing.
Corporate lawyers who give their clients advice about how to
pursue ethically and socially responsible paths must carefully
choose the most appropriate strategies for advising managers
who often resist this kind of guidance. Should socially
responsible corporate conduct be the goal simply because the
lawyer concludes that it is the right thing to do? Should lawyers
tell their corporate clients to do good simply for its own sake? Or
should they encourage corporate clients to do good for the
financial good of their companies?
B. Duty of Care Breaches at Enron
Newspaper accounts of the report drafted by members of a
special committee of the Enron board formed after the company's
problems became public suggest that at least some managers
may have engaged in criminal wrongdoing.37  The special
committee chair, Bill Powers, Dean of the University of Texas
School of Law, concluded that Enron's board of directors
breached the fiduciary duty of care it owed to the company's
shareholders. 38
One question raised by Enron's corporate governance lapses
is how to measure satisfaction of the duty of care on the part of
Enron's corporate officers. Reasonableness governs the duty of
37 Decoding Enron, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2002, at A24.
38 See Katie Fairbank & Jim Landers, Lay Knew Enron Was Hiding Losses,
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Feb. 5, 2002, at IA. According to Powers:
There was a fundamental default of leadership and management.
Leadership and management begin at the top, with the CEO, Ken Lay. In
this company, leadership and management depended as well on the chief
operating officer, Jeffrey Skilling. The board of directors failed in its duty
to provide leadership and oversight.
Id.; see also "Yes Men" Make Up Boards That Miss Enron-Type Failings, U.S.A.
TODAY, Feb. 21, 2002, at 16A.
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care owed by both directors and officers. The standard of care
owed by officers and directors may be the same, but the amount
of care owed by the company's managers of day-to-day affairs
should be unavoidably higher than the amount of care owed by a
company's outside directors with far less contact and
involvement with the company.
Enron managers such as Andrew Fastow clearly breached
fiduciary duties owed shareholders. Fastow breached the duty of
loyalty because he had a material financial interest in the
transactions between Enron and the investment partnerships he
created and managed. 39 Other Enron employees who enriched
themselves also breached fiduciary duties of loyalty.40
What about the Eriron managers who did not reap pecuniary
benefits from Enron's transactions, with the suspect
partnerships? They did not breach the fiduciary duty of loyalty,
but they may have breached the fiduciary duty of care they owed
shareholders. One Enron executive observed that Jeffrey
Skilling "surrounded himself with 'yes men.' "41 It would be
reasonable to argue that the "yes men," if they were corporate
officers, breached the duty of care by invariably saying yes
instead of adequately investigating, monitoring, and ensuring
compliance with law.
One cannot ignore the troubling relationship between
Enron's managers and its board. "The directors have
maintained... that they were misled by some Enron executives
and were never told about critical transactions. '" 42 According to
some newspaper accounts, transactions were hidden from the
board.43 At this point, the extent to which managers misled the
board is unclear. There are clear allegations, however, that
Kenneth Lay, the former Chair of Enron's Board of Directors,
was "disengaged and unfamiliar with many aspects of his own
39 See Report of Investigation by the Special Investigative Comm. of the Board
of Directors of Enron, United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of
New York, 2002 Extra LEXIS 45, at *7-*8 (Feb. 1, 2002).
40 Id.
41 Zellner, supra note 28, at 39.
42 Reed Abelson, Shareholder Advocates Press for Actions Against Directors,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2002, at A20.
43 See, e.g., Excerpts From Testimony Before House Subcomm. on Enron
Collapse, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2002, at C4 (quoting statement of William C. Powers
Jr.).
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company."44 If this characterization of Lay's tenure as Chairman
of the Board is accurate, he has in fact breached the duty of care
he owes shareholders.
The very culture at Enron risked the kinds of managerial
breaches and possibly criminal conduct that occurred. 45 One
former Enron manager observed that "'[tihe environment was
ripe for abuse.... It was completely hands-off management. A
situation like that requires tight controls. Instead, it was a
runaway train.' "46 In fact, Enron's board did not hold the
company's Risk Assessment and Control group accountable.
This group, that was supposed to serve as an internal
mechanism to manage risky corporate conduct, reported to
Jeffrey Skilling, the executive who incited excessively risky
conduct at Enron.47 Jeffrey Skilling "created and embodied the
in-your-face Enron culture, where risk-taking, deal-making, and
'thinking outside the box' were richly rewarded, while controls
appeared loose at best."48
C. Duty of Care Breaches in Cases of Racial Discrimination
The inadequate monitoring of corporate compliance with law
is a breach of the directorial and managerial duty of care owed to
shareholders and is contrary to the shareholder primacy
paradigm that is the fundamental tenet of state corporate law. 49
In another article, I apply the language of the Delaware
Chancery Court in In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative
Litigation50 to the conduct of corporate managers at Texaco and
Coca-Cola, two companies that paid large amounts to settle
racial discrimination litigation in the 1990s. 51 In Caremark, the
court approved the settlement of a derivative suit. The suit was
brought by shareholders alleging that the board and officers'
failure to adequately monitor corporate employees resulted in
,4 Julie Mason, Lay Told Analysts Of Faith In CFO; Enron Placed Fastow on
Leave the Following Day, HOUSTON CHRON., Feb. 21, 2002, at Al.
45 See John A. Byrne, The Environment Was Ripe for Abuse, BUS. WK., Feb. 25,
2002, at 118.
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 Zellner, supra note 28, at 38.
49 See, e.g., Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) (stating
that a "corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of
stockholders").
50 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
51 See Wade, supra note 10, at 404-05.
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violation of federal and state laws applicable to health care
providers. The Caremark court described the type of directorial
and managerial conduct 'that would breach the fiduciary duty of
care owed to shareholders. The court advised that a board's
"sustained or systematic failure" to monitor compliance with law
would amount to a duty of care breach. 52 The conduct described
in Caremark is the kind of conduct that led to losses suffered by
the shareholders of Texaco and Coca-Cola when the companies
paid large amounts to settle.53 There was a sustained and
systematic failure of the directors and managers of Texaco and
Coca-Cola to investigate and monitor alleged racial
discrimination.
Caremark is merely a settlement opinion and, therefore, has
no precedential value.54  Yet, it offers potentially helpful
guidance with respect to the kind of conduct that satisfies the
fiduciary duty of care. A board's egregious failure to monitor
employees' compliance with law that results in losses due to
fines and penalties imposed upon the company, may make it
possible for shareholders to recover those losses in a derivative
action. It must be acknowledged, however, that a board has
limited time and ability for oversight. "The board cannot design,
install, operate, or monitor the operation of [internal information
systems]; but the board can press for the installation [sic] and
call for periodic assurances that they are in place." 55
Neither Texaco, nor Coca-Cola, nor any of the other
companies that have recently paid large amounts to settle racial
discrimination claims had installed a system to monitor
compliance with anti-discrimination law before the litigation.
While this observation offers some insight, it is also true that the
number of things a board should do is almost infinite.
[A]ny plaintiffs lawyer of even the most modest talent and
imagination will always be able to find a subject matter X as to
52 In re Caremark Int'l. Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 971 (Del. Ch.
1996).
53 Corporate officers at Texaco, for example, ignored Texaco employees who
complained of racially discriminatory employment practices. This executive
inaction, and directorial failure to exercise appropriate oversight, allowed the
problem to fester. Eventually, the company paid over $175 million to settle a class
action racial discrimination suit. See ROBERTS & WHITE, supra note 27, at 276.
54 Caremark, 698 A.2d at 960-61.
55 Bayless Manning, The Business Judgment Rule and the Director's Duty of
Attention: Time for Reality, 39 BUS. LAW 1477, 1484 (1984).
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which he can denounce its directors, declaiming: "Surely any
reasonable prudent person in these circumstances would have
explored subject X, but this board sat back, did nothing, and did
not even inquire into it."'56
The list of things to be monitored by boards is extensive,
almost limitless. That is why board members deserve and
receive the protection of the business judgment rule. The rule,
however, was not intended to protect board members or senior
executives in the face of blatant, ongoing corporate malfeasance.
Texaco shareholders did in fact file derivative litigation
against Texaco's directors and managers alleging breach of
fiduciary duties to oversee Texaco's compliance with federal and
state law prohibiting discrimination. The derivative suit was
settled, and the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York issued an opinion reducing the fee awarded
plaintiffs' attorneys for the services they rendered in filing and
negotiating a settlement of the derivative suit.57 The value of
the plaintiffs' claim was one of the factors the court considered in
determining that plaintiffs' attorneys' fees should be reduced by
$400,000.58 The court concluded that:
[A] rational director could well conclude that the absence of
substantial assets on the part of the actual malefactors renders
the claim against them not worth pursuing in behalf of the
corporation, as a matter of business judgment. Also... the
required showing of reckless indifference to support individual
director liability for failure to catch the problem in time to
avoid the substantial damage visited on the corporation [by the
racial discrimination class action] presents a high threshold,
which on the present record very likely could not have been
met.
59
The court's observations may indicate that plaintiffs
neglected to include as defendants all of the officers of Texaco
who heard complaints from employees of color but failed to take
steps to address them. Clearly, Texaco's officers were recklessly
indifferent to the complaints made by Texaco's employees of
color. The court, however, spoke only to directorial scienter.
Even if Texaco's board did not have a complete understanding of
56 Id. at 1485.
57 In re Texaco, Inc. Sholder Litig., 20 F. Supp. 2d 577, 596 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
58 See id. at 591-92.
59 Id. at 585.
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the complaints made by Texaco's minority employees, their
managers certainly did. The court made no attempt to address
the "reckless indifference" of Texaco's officers. 60 Nor did the
court distinguish between the level of care that should be
exercised by inside, as opposed to outside, directors.
Even if Texaco's board had no reason to ask officers about
racial discrimination, the boards of companies with few or no
minorities among senior managers or executives may be
recklessly indifferent to the possibility of litigation and, large
settlements if they fail to ask their officers the right questions in
the aftermath of the large settlements paid by Texaco and Coca-
Cola. In other words, the boards of large public companies
should inquire about racial discrimination in order to avoid the
negative publicity and huge settlements that plagued Texaco
and Coca-Cola.
CONCLUSION
Corporate officers and managers have a duty of care similar
to that owed by directors. Satisfaction of that duty, however,
requires a greater amount of care because of managers' day-to-
day involvement with the company. This greater involvement
can only be an effective mechanism for ensuring responsible
corporate behavior if there are also lines of communication
between officers and directors. In particular, a board's
independent directors must be available to receive managers'
reports of misconduct. Such communication can create the
oversight and involvement by the board necessary to ensure
more ethical behavior by corporate actors.
60 Id. The court correctly noted that a board may decide not to pursue litigation
against an individual because the costs outweigh the benefits of such litigation
when the potential defendant has little money.
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